Emory Law Journal
Volume 65

Issue 4

2016

Reconciling Contractualized Procedure in Litigation and
Arbitration: A Textual and Policy-Based Approach
Logan S. Kotler

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj

Recommended Citation
Logan S. Kotler, Reconciling Contractualized Procedure in Litigation and Arbitration: A Textual and PolicyBased Approach, 65 Emory L. J. 1177 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol65/iss4/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

KOTLER GALLEYSPROOFS2

4/18/2016 2:27 PM

RECONCILING CONTRACTUALIZED PROCEDURE IN
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: A TEXTUAL AND
POLICY-BASED APPROACH
ABSTRACT
This Comment examines the prospect of procedural contracts by
comparing the text and policies of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules). As the existing body of
literature addressing the normative desirability and plausibility of
contractualized procedure grows, this Comment seeks to add textual and
policy-based reasons against uncritically redesigning litigation in arbitration’s
image. Private contracts already govern in the private dispute-resolution
arena, particularly in arbitration. Should parties be equally capable of
dictating the rules that govern litigation?
This Comment views freedom of contract along a spectrum, where on one
end there are non-negotiable mandates set forth for the public to follow, and
freely negotiable terms, such as arbitration agreements under the FAA, toward
the other end. This Comment comports with existing scholarship in that it
views procedure as negotiable to some extent. However, based on its analyses
of the text and policies behind the FAA and the Federal Rules, this Comment
ultimately concludes that parties should have less procedural modification
freedom in litigation than in arbitration.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) do not explicitly
grant parties any freedom to contractually modify procedures in litigation.1
However, the existing body of literature on the subject suggests that at least
some of the Federal Rules either already are, or should be, negotiable.2
Envisioning the rules as bargained-for commodities, some scholars suggest
that a set of promulgated, one-size-fits-all rules, such as the Federal Rules,
should be relegated to mere default status that would fulfill more of a
gap-filling function.3
Granted, contractualizing dispute-governing procedure is hardly a new
phenomenon. Disputants have been able to choose the rules under which they
resolve their disputes, privately, for ages.4 Today, the Federal Arbitration Act5
(FAA) allows parties the contractual freedom to tailor their procedural rules as
they see fit in private arbitration.6 However, a fundamental dissimilarity

1 See FED. R. CIV. P. For the purposes of this Comment, wherever the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are mentioned, it should be assumed that the litigation is in federal court.
2 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice,
90 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2012); Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 507 (2011); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723
(2011); Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103
(2011); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389 (2014); Michael L.
Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461
(2007); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in
Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579 (2007); Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for
Customized Litigation by the Norms Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471 (2013); Elizabeth
Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181; Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing
Procedure 12–14 (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1323056.
3 See, e.g., Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 12 n.44 (“One of the hallmarks of the U.S. law is the
extent to which the rules of procedure are ‘default’ rules, rules that govern if the parties have not agreed to
something else.” (quoting STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (7th ed. 2008))).
4 Arbitration is an ancient method of dispute resolution. JAY FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES:
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 538 (2d ed. 2010). For example, in Biblical Times, King Solomon was famous
for his wisdom as an arbitrator; archaeologists have found papyrus documenting arbitration among Phoenician
grain traders; Native American tribes turned to wise elders to resolve disputes; and George Washington
himself was an arbiter and even had an arbitration clause in his will. Id. at 538–39.
5 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
6 Cf. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (noting that Congress’s intent in
passing the Act was to enforce private agreements that parties willing entered into). But cf. Hall St. Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (prohibiting parties from supplementing the FAA’s four grounds
for arbitral award vacation).
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separates arbitration from litigation: arbitration is a private means of dispute
resolution, whereas our litigation system is public by design.7
This Comment addresses an open question emerging from the vast
literature addressing procedural contracts: Should parties be allowed to modify
the procedural rules of litigation with the same amount of freedom as in
arbitration? This Comment answers this question by arguing that parties should
be allowed to contractually modify procedure in litigation, but to a lesser
extent than in arbitration agreements. It views freedom of contract along a
spectrum, where on one end there are non-negotiable mandates set forth for the
public to follow, and on the other end, freely negotiable terms, such as
arbitration agreements under the FAA. Although other scholars have reached
comparable conclusions,8 this Comment seeks to add to existing scholarship by
providing a novel textual and policy-based rationale.
First, Part I of this Comment provides a background on the relatively new
concept of commoditized procedure. It explores existing literature and
provides broad conceptual background for procedural contracts. Part I also
examines the expansion of the FAA, vis-à-vis the freedom of contract
principles the Supreme Court relied upon in authoring this expansion. Second,
Part II of this Comment uses textual and policy-based reasoning to argue that
parties should be able to contractually modify procedure in litigation, but only
to a lesser extent than in arbitration. Finally, Part III of this Comment first
discusses the implications that follow the judiciary’s adaptation of either a
broad, narrow, or mixed procedural freedom regime, and then applies textual
and policy-based reasoning to determine the extent to which parties should be
able to modify procedural terms common to arbitration in litigation.
I. PROCEDURAL CONTRACTS AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
This Part serves primarily to provide background on the relatively new
concept of commoditized procedure. Section A introduces procedural
contracts. Section B then addresses the FAA: it explores the Supreme Court’s

7 See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 30–32 (1979).
8 Cf. Bone, supra note 2, at 1355 (positing that “[i]f it makes sense to bar some types of party
rulemaking in adjudication even when those types are permissible in arbitration, it must be because
adjudication is different in a normatively relevant way”). To be clear, Professor Bone writes in terms of
“adjudication” and “arbitration,” whereas this Comment writes in terms of “litigation” and “arbitration.” For
purposes of this Comment, the term “litigation” describes the adjudicative process of litigation in its entirety.
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expansion of the FAA, and the principles upon which the Court relied in doing
so.
A. Understanding Procedural Contracts
The U.S. litigation system, while central to American democracy, has been
rendered “slow, costly, and relatively inflexible” in part because of its coat of
procedural protections.9 In the 1960s, the notion of civil litigation changed;
responding to civil unrest and general discontent, legislatures created new
statutory causes of action, and, as a result, “[c]onflicts that in the past might
have been resolved by deference, avoidance, or resignation were directed to the
courts.”10 Furthermore, caseloads increased, and resources were not
proportionately allotted to the courts.11 With courts struggling to manage their
dockets, both judges and parties were in need of alternatives; judges assumed a
more managerial role and began facilitating settlements, whereas parties began
turning to private alternatives such as arbitration.12 In fact, the percentage of
federal cases that reached trial fell from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% by 2002.13 And
while this does not mean disputes have been going unresolved,14 the fact is,
“[t]he public spectacle of civil litigation gives life to the ‘rule of law,’” and this
spectacle seems to be vanishing.15
Furthermore, over time, arbitration (in many contexts) has begun to look
more and more like litigation, increasing in complexity and—concomitantly—
in the demand for at least minimal due process guarantees.16 In light of
arbitration’s evolution, it is conceivable, and arguably normatively optimal, to
reconfigure the familiar judicial system to represent the best of both worlds: a
forum that allows parties efficient, inexpensive, just resolution that can be
governed by rules chosen by the parties themselves.

9

FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 7.
Id. at 7–8.
11 Id. at 8.
12 Id.
13 Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The Vanishing Trial, 30 A.B.A. J. SEC. LITIG., Winter 2004, at
1, 1, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/litigation_journal/04winter_openingstatement.
authcheckdam.pdf.
14 Indeed, ADR processes such as arbitration have seen steep growth since the 1960s. FOLBERG ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 7.
15 Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is
Reshaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 196 (2003).
16 On injecting due process into arbitration, see PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 127−70 (2013).
10
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Procedural contracts are the new frontier.17 Indeed, procedural contracts
may enable the public court system to more proficiently accomplish the same
two goals for which the Supreme Court has already specifically endorsed
arbitration: efficiency and freedom of contract.18 However, the question is
whether, and to what extent, a court of law should allow parties to tailor the
litigation process to their liking. And, if parties should try to modify procedure,
should judges look to FAA jurisprudence for guidance where the Supreme
Court has prescribed clear and potentially applicable principles for achieving
efficient, party-driven resolution? This section addresses the current scholarly
understanding of procedural contracts, including their enforceability and
potential advantages and concerns associated therewith. Part II will then
address whether the judiciary should look to FAA jurisprudence for
guidance—and concludes that it should not because parties should have less
procedural-modification freedom in litigation than in arbitration based on the
text and policies underlying the FAA and the Federal Rules.
This section is divided into five sub-sections.19 First, it explains what a
procedural contract is and examines previous scholarship on the subject for
background information. Second, this section describes the advantages of
contractually modifying litigation procedure. Third, it offers an explanation as
to why parties might choose court over an arbitral forum if they could modify
litigation procedure. Fourth, beginning with forum-selection clauses, this
section briefly surveys several types of procedural terms that parties may
choose to modify in a pre-dispute contract. Finally, this section sets forth some
predictable concerns that could arise if parties are allotted too much freedom to
tailor the procedures that govern their dispute before any such dispute arises.
1. What Is a Procedural Contract?
Procedural contracts, unsurprisingly, are contracts in which parties modify
the procedures that govern any potential disputes between them.20 An
arbitration agreement is one such example of a procedural contract.21 Other

17 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 2, at 391–92 (imagining litigation uniquely tailored to specific parties’
dispute).
18 This Comment will further discuss why it is important to look at the policies behind arbitration when
considering procedural contracts. Infra Part II.C.1.
19 For much of the structure and content of this background section, I am indebted to the excellent
discussion in Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2.
20 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 2, at 397.
21 Procedurally speaking, arbitration agreements remove cases from Article III forums.

KOTLER GALLEYSPROOFS2

1182

4/18/2016 2:27 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1177

common examples of procedural contracts include forum-selection clauses and
jury-trial waivers.22 Although contracts for such terms might not obviously
affect litigants’ substantive rights, several scholars believe that procedural
contracts could be used to alter litigation procedures once thought to be
untouchable, transforming civil procedure rules into mere default rules.23 For
example, some scholars, such as Professors Kapeliuk, Klement, and Hoffman,
have suggested the theoretical potential for parties to contractually revert to a
pre-Twombly pleading regime.24
Undoubtedly, reasonable procedural contracts could be advantageous in
certain contexts.25 However, lines must be drawn to maintain a balance
between favoring party autonomy and giving parties unlimited power to
control the rules that govern judges and the judicial process overall. One
important question that arises in this context is to whom a dispute belongs.
This question is addressed in Part II.C.2.
As a preliminary point, it should be explicated that this Part’s background
information sets up a tantalizing comparison between arbitration and
contractualized procedure in litigation. Nevertheless, understanding the
historical posture on commoditized procedure is the natural starting point.
Bargaining for procedure is a relatively new concept. In 1972, the Supreme
Court opened the door to the commoditization of procedure with its landmark
decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., where the Court enforced a
forum-selection clause in a contract between two sophisticated merchants.26
Lately, scholars have discussed the potential for expansive use of pre-dispute
commoditization of procedure in litigation.27 Because parties already
“strategically employ procedure during the litigation process,” the scholars’
argument follows that, if given the latitude to do so, parties will seek to “use
procedural terms to maximize strategic advantage in the same manner, trading

22

See, e.g., Paulson, supra note 2, at 485, 488.
E.g., Hoffman, supra note 2, at 398.
24 See Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around Twombly, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 18–20
(2010); accord Hoffman, supra note 2, at 391, 398.
25 Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 3 (listing advantages of pre-dispute procedural modification in
litigation).
26 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Many courts were suspicious of forum-selection clauses before The Bremen, and
viewed them as prohibited under the “ouster doctrine.” Paulson, supra note 2, at 485. The “ouster” doctrine
compelled courts to hold that “parties could not eliminate a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case by private
contract.” Id. Many courts also applied this doctrine to arbitration agreements, for similar reasons. Id.
27 E.g., Dodge, supra note 2, at 739.
23
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off differences in expected outcome from procedural modification just as
substantive terms exploit differences in valuation.”28
Today, “[c]ontract law’s sovereignty over litigation procedure is a radical
and exciting idea,” and the “normative desirability” thereof has been called a
“hot topic in the civil procedure academy.”29 Because of its great importance,
the remainder of this section explores the normative desirability of procedural
contracts, beginning with their advantages and ending with concerns associated
therewith.
2. Advantages of Pre-Dispute Procedural Contracts
Parties already have wide latitude in making post-dispute modifications
under the Federal Rules.30 Settlement agreements are perhaps the biggest
example: by contractually settling a dispute after it arises, the involved parties
waive the right to their day in court.31 More generally speaking, however,
because there may be a “possible divergence between . . . parties’ pre-dispute
and post-dispute interests,”32 the idea that parties modify procedure
post-dispute illuminates the great need for such procedural tools pre-dispute.
In their leading manuscript, Kapeliuk and Klement explain how
contractualized procedure can “further enhance [parties’] contractual gains by
modifying procedural rules before the dispute arises,” rather than doing so
afterward.33 Although most contractual terms are substantive in nature,34
parties might also benefit from altering the way their dispute will be litigated
by contractually modifying procedure.35 In a freely bargained-for, legally valid

28

Id.
Hoffman, supra note 2, at 391.
30 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 12–14 (surveying some ways that parties make post-dispute
procedural modifications under the Federal Rules, and in particular, post-dispute discovery stipulations).
31 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3901, at 18–19 (2d ed. 1992); accord Bone, supra note 2, at 1351.
32 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 13–14 (explaining that while post-dispute modifications are
largely available, parties have different motives post-dispute, and post-dispute agreements “simply cannot
address prior (and often joint) opportunities because they are already forgone by the time of dispute”).
33 Id. at 6. Kapeliuk and Klement explain that “[c]ooperation is much more likely at the contracting
stage,” id. at 17, possibly because parties operate behind a “veil of ignorance” regarding the many
contingencies that may lead to a potential dispute, id., and possibly because parties, at the time of contract,
“enjoy a high degree of trust and cooperation.” Id. at 18.
34 Id. at 14. On the substance–procedure spectrum, see Dodge, supra note 2, at 732–33.
35 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 14.
29
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contract, parties can use contractualized procedure to reduce litigation costs,36
prevent opportunistic behavior,37 shape their pre-dispute behavior,38 and
provide themselves with an information signaling and sorting mechanism at
the time of contracting.39 Ultimately, Kapeliuk and Klement argue, “similar
advantages cannot be realized after the dispute has arisen through modification
or waiver of procedural rights.”40
3. Why Not Arbitrate?
Pre-dispute procedural contracts offer parties the ability to alter the rules of
litigation in ways that can increase their joint welfare in future disputes.41
Many pre-dispute procedural modifications, however, are already attainable
through arbitration agreements.42 Hence, understanding why parties choose to
arbitrate disputes, and why they may prefer a public forum to an arbitral one is
important. Some of the key advantages of choosing arbitration over litigation
include disputing parties’ freedom to select their own decision-maker(s),43
parties’ flexibility in designing the rules governing a dispute,44 speed and cost
benefits,45 and the finality of an arbitral award.46 Additionally, arbitration is

36 See id. at 16–19 (explaining how “[l]itigants can lower their costs by cooperatively limiting their
investment in trial, refraining from discovery abuse, avoiding unnecessary motions, and negotiating a possible
settlement in an open and collaborative manner”).
37 See id. (noting that “parties enjoy a high degree of trust and cooperation” at the pre-dispute stage, and
“[c]ooperation requires the litigants to negotiate the terms of any prospective arrangement to restrict their
opportunistic behavior”).
38 Id. at 19–23 (explaining how pre-dispute procedural agreements affect “parties’ incentives to comply
with substantive law and to perform in accordance with their contractual obligations”).
39 See id. at 23–25 (discussing how pre-dispute procedural agreements can “help resolve information
asymmetries which substantive mechanisms cannot address”).
40 Id. at 26.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 542. Parties typically select either one arbitrator or a panel of
arbitrators, generally based on their industry expertise. See id.
44 Id. at 543. Arbitration affords parties the opportunity to “craft[] a private system of justice tailored to
fit the needs of their specific dispute.” Id.
45 Arbitration is generally viewed as less expensive and less time-consuming than litigation. Id. at 542.
But see Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 28–29 (positing that arbitration costs may not necessarily be
lower than litigation, especially since upfront costs, including attorney’s fees and various administrative costs,
are higher).
46 See ABRAHAM P. ORDOVER & ANDREA DONEFF, ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION: MEDIATION,
ARBITRATION, AND THE ART OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 143–45 (2d ed. 2002).
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less formal than litigation,47 and—because of its private nature—is more easily
kept confidential than litigation.48
While arbitration already offers procedural freedom in ways presently
unthinkable in litigation,49 there are significant reasons why arbitration is not a
perfect substitute dispute-resolution forum for parties who wish simply to
modify procedures.50 Some reasons that make litigation preferable to
arbitration include arbitration’s potentially higher costs,51 avoiding the time
and effort spent negotiating an arbitration agreement’s terms, and arbitrators’
vulnerability to market pressures.52 Additionally, arbitrators have been shown
to “split the difference” between the parties’ settlement offers, rather than
finding in favor of a definitive winner.53 Finally, as discussed in greater depth
in Part II, potentially the most significant reason involves the judiciary’s role in
serving public functions beyond mere dispute resolution.54
4. Enforceability of Procedural Contracts
The prospect of transforming the American litigation system with
procedural contracts is equally exciting and unnerving. Since the enactment of
the Federal Rules in 1938, the federal judiciary has been governed by uniform
rules that create a one-size-fits-all litigation system.55 Some of the Supreme
47

Id. at 145.
Id. at 143 (noting that arbitration is private and that everything done in arbitration can be kept
confidential).
49 See Moffitt, supra note 2, at 518 (remarking that “arbitration parties can reform pleading requirements,
set their own calendar, and choose their own arbitrator”).
50 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 26–27; Moffitt, supra note 2, at 518–19.
51 See, e.g., Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 29 nn.105–06 and accompanying text (surveying
reports and studies regarding cost differentials between arbitration and litigation, and concluding that
arbitration costs, which parties internalize fully, may be significantly higher than litigation costs); see also
Moffitt, supra note 2, at 518–19 (arguing that cost is one factor that makes arbitration not as accessible as the
courts).
52 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 27 (arguing that market incentives “may lead arbitrators to
compromise litigants’ pre-dispute interests for their post-dispute satisfaction”). Arbitrators have an incentive to
maximize both parties’ satisfaction, so as to increase the likelihood they are re-appointed in the future. Id. at
30. On the other hand, disputants do not hire judges, and judges’ incomes are not affected by the quantity of
cases they decide or decision they render. Id. Thus, judges are not similarly subject to such market pressures.
Id.
53 See, e.g., id. at 32 n.119 and accompanying text (citing David E. Bloom, Empirical Models of
Arbitrator Behavior Under Conventional Arbitration, 68 REV. ECON. & STAT. 578, 585 (1986)). But see id. at
32 (conceding that “empirical literature cannot unequivocally corroborate the proposition that arbitrators tend
toward finding middle grounds between parties”).
54 See infra Part II.C.2.
55 See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 524 (3d ed. 2012).
48
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Court’s goals in promulgating the Federal Rules are explicit. First, as Rule 1
explains, the rules “should be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”56
Second, the Rules Enabling Act, which gives the Supreme Court “the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence,”
concurrently commands that “such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive right.”57 Finally, as the 1993 Advisory Committee Notes
explain, the judiciary has an “affirmative duty . . . to exercise the authority
conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only
fairly, but also without undue cost or delay.”58 Hence, the explicit purposes of
the Federal Rules are just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of claims, and
the separation of procedure and substance.59
Although the goals are transparent, the Federal Rules themselves do not
explicitly address which rules are mandatory and which might be negotiable.
The Federal Rules do not reflect any evidence that the drafters foresaw the
commoditization of procedure.60 Nevertheless, courts have held at least some
Federal Rules to be negotiable.61 Indeed, literature addressing the types of
enforceable procedural contract terms is vast;62 however, for clarity, the
following survey briefly examines three general categories of procedural
contract terms.
The Supreme Court opened the door to the commoditization of procedure
in 1972 with its landmark decision in The Bremen, where the Court enforced a
forum-selection clause in a contract between two merchants.63 Thereby, the
Court made it clear that at least some procedural terms can be treated as

56

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). Another goal, “uniformity,” can be implied from the
first principle of the Rules Enabling Act, which states that the rules are “general” and apply to all “cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.”
See Paulson, supra note 2, at 479 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012)). The Rules Enabling Act also recognizes
a distinction between procedure and substantive rights, preventing courts from creating rules that directly
interfere with adjudication of the merits. See id.
58 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
59 See Paulson, supra note 2, at 479–83 (discussing the purposes of the Federal Rules).
60 Infra notes 179–81.
61 See Elliott-McGowan Prods. v. Republic Prods., Inc., 145 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (approving a
pre-dispute contract modifying the rules of discovery).
62 See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 391–93 & nn.7–14 and accompanying text for a breakdown of the
normative positions taken by scholars on the subject.
63 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 444–45 (2011); see supra note 26.
57
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commodities worth bargaining for.64 Today, procedural terms can be grouped
into three general categories.65 The first category includes contracts that act as
gatekeepers to a particular forum, such as forum-selection clauses,66 jury
waivers,67 and appeal waivers.68 The second category includes contracts that
place limitations on available theories of relief, such as contractual limitation
periods69 and clauses limiting damages.70 Agreements to waive class actions
could fit in the second category as well.71 The third category includes contracts
that seem to affect the judge’s ability to decide the merits of a case, such as
rules that limit discovery72 or the court’s ability to consider and weigh
evidence.73
However, while courts and commentators have addressed enforceability
issues with respect to certain procedural terms, “the Supreme Court has not yet
conclusively determined the enforceability of terms that regulate the courts
directly.”74 Furthermore, according to recent empirical studies, there is scant
case law and empirical evidence supporting the notion that contractualized
64 See The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1. In its seminal decision, the Supreme Court held enforceable a
forum-selection clause in a “freely negotiated international commercial transaction between [two
corporations].” Id. at 17. The Court based its reasoning largely on “strong evidence that the forum clause was a
vital part of the agreement,” and that it would be “unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their
negotiations, including fixing monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently
in their calculations.” Id. at 13–14. However, the Court used seemingly careful language to limit its decision to
“freely negotiated” contracts. See id. at 12–13 (proclaiming that “[t]here are compelling reasons why a freely
negotiated . . . agreement . . . should be given full effect” (emphasis added)); id. at 14 (“There is strong
evidence that the forum clause was a vital part of the agreement . . . .”). Nevertheless, shortly after The
Bremen, the Court enforced a forum-selection clause in a non-freely-bargained-for contract between parties
with unequal bargaining power. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 592–94 (1991). Curiously,
the majority made no factual distinction between the contracts at issue in The Bremen and in Carnival Cruise.
See id. Justice Stevens dissented on this ground, asserting that the adhesive nature of the contract begs special,
and more suspect, treatment. Id. at 600–01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65 For his applicable categorization of terms, I am indebted to Paulson, supra note 2, at 485.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 485, 488. While the “Supreme Court has not yet faced the issue of whether an ex ante contract to
waive the right to a jury trial is enforceable in an action filed in federal court,” district courts and courts of
appeals have uniformly held that such a clause is enforceable. See Noyes, supra note 2, at 604 (citing Debra T.
Landis, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92 A.L.R. FED. 688 (2003)).
68 For a discussion on appeal waivers, see Paulson supra note 2, at 491–98.
69 For a discussion on contractual statutes of limitations, see id. at 498–501.
70 See id. at 501–11.
71 Cf. Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication Doctrine in U.S.
Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 376 (2014) (noting that for many plaintiffs with small
damage claims, individual vindication is economically unfeasible).
72 See Elliott-McGowan Prods. v. Republic Prods., Inc., 145 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
73 For a discussion on contractually altering evidentiary rules, see Paulson, supra note 2, at 511–22.
74 Dodge, supra note 2, at 737.
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procedure is widespread.75 Ultimately, however, assuming procedural contracts
are forthcoming, the discussion must move beyond examples of terms and
toward the problems associated with such contracts.
5. Problems Associated with Contractualized Procedure
Not all scholars are wholeheartedly in favor of a party-driven rulemaking
regime.76 Some fear that “virtually unregulated” contractualized procedure
may threaten the legitimacy of the litigation system in various ways.77 The first
and most obvious issue is whether contractualized procedure might confuse,
overwhelm, or unduly burden the court.78 Other concerns include
contractualized procedure’s potential for impeding information exchanges;79
undermining judicial integrity;80 creating problems associated with defective
consent in non-freely-bargained-for contracts;81 and allowing parties to
inefficiently allocate and use public judicial resources.82
The first way contractualized procedure may adversely impact the litigation
system is by limiting information exchanges.83 Information about a dispute and
information about the process of adjudication are considered public goods that
are generated during the course of adjudicating a dispute.84 Accordingly,
Professors Davis and Hershkoff argue that “[c]ontractual provisions of some
kinds tend to limit the flow of information to actors who would be entitled to
receive that information under publicly sponsored rules of civil procedure.”85

75 See generally Hoffman, supra note 2, at 402–20 (exploring EDGAR database but failing to find
sufficient evidence of many procedural contract terms).
76 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 2, at 1384–97; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 541–53 (arguing that
“there are sound functional reasons to be concerned about the outsourcing of procedure”).
77 See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 541.
78 Moffitt, supra note 2, at 514–15 (arguing that, despite the potential issues of confusing, overwhelming,
and burdening the courts, “we have no reason to think that the costs would be so overwhelming that they
would outweigh the potential benefits of customization”).
79 See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 541–53.
80 Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 42–44.
81 Id. at 44–49.
82 Id. at 39–42.
83 Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 541.
84 See id. Professors Davis and Hershkoff explain that “[r]ules that govern . . . pleadings . . . [and]
discovery regulate the transmission of information . . . between the parties,” “[r]ules that provide for class
actions . . . determine who is automatically entitled to receive the information generated as the dispute moves
through [the litigation process],” and “rules that govern public access to proceedings and the publication of
judicial opinions determine the extent to which all of this information is accessible to the public and to the
courts.” Id. at 542.
85 Id. at 542–43.
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Also, “provisions that alter or stunt the flow of information to courts . . . could
affect the quality of judicial decision making.”86 They first argue that the
“information blockage could affect . . . the court system’s ability to resolve
disputes within the framework of existing law,”87 and, second, that the “stunted
flow of information can distort the creation of precedent and impede efforts by
regulators, legislators, and other policymakers to identify social problems and
devise public solutions.”88
The second way that contractualized procedure might adversely impact the
litigation system is that too much party freedom may undermine the
institutional integrity of the judiciary.89 “The public court system serves both
private and public functions,” whereby it “provide[s] a private dispute
resolution service as well as produce[s] precedents and legal rules, which are
public goods that benefit society at large.”90 Thus, adhering to the rules of civil
procedure “substantiate[s] [the court’s] judicial integrity and commitment to a
fair and efficient process and to the search for a just and accurate judicial
resolution of disputes.”91 It should not be surprising, then, that pre-dispute
procedural contracts, which alter the very rules that uphold judicial integrity,
are capable of undermining the judiciary’s institutional integrity.92 Kapeliuk
and Klement identify two categories of procedural arrangements that could
harm the court’s reputation:
[P]rocedural arrangements that change the mode of judicial
decision-making, or impart such decision-making to non-judicial
mechanisms, yet require the court to embrace the outcomes of these
mechanisms and implement them;[93] and procedural arrangements

86

Id. at 543.
Id. at 542; see also Bone, supra note 2, at 1375–78 (discussing the outcome-quality costs of party
rulemaking).
88 Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 544; see also Bone, supra note 2, at 1377–78 (discussing possible
adverse impacts of party rulemaking on future suits by affecting the quality of legal precedent).
89 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 42–44.
90 Id. at 42; accord infra Part II.C.2.
91 Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 42 (concluding that because “precedents, public trust and
judicial integrity are all public goods whose benefits are enjoyed by all members of society,” and because
“public courts . . . decid[e] their cases on the basis of substantive law,” “courts enjoy a reputational capital
which litigants use and at the same time substantiate”).
92 See id. at 44.
93 Id. (explaining that arrangements in this category “mak[e] inefficient use of scarce judicial resources,”
and are thus “inefficient irrespective of their reputational effect”).
87
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that create an imbalanced process, adversely affecting the court’s
accuracy in a biased manner.94

Third, consent issues associated with altering procedural terms in
standard-form contracts, contracts of adhesion, and contracts between parties
with significantly disparate bargaining power may be cause for concern.95
While it may be true that “the fact that a contract does not involve bargaining
is not a reason by itself to condemn it,”96 one major criticism of such contracts
is that they do not reflect any meaningful consent from the weaker party where
bargaining power is skewed.97 However, the conversation regarding “defective
consent” has mainly been directed at arbitration agreements.98 Accordingly,
some arguments against adhesive arbitration agreements would not be equally
alarming in the procedural contract context.99 For example, an oft-cited
concern with mandatory arbitration of employment disputes is that
adjudication in a court of law is “superior to arbitration for enforcing the broad
public interest in statutory civil rights claims, such as Title VII claims, Age
Discrimination in Employment Act claims, and the like.”100 However, there
would be no corresponding anti-adhesive argument against adhesive
procedural contracts because procedural contracts are to be adjudicated in a
court of law, where statutory civil rights claims were intended to be
adjudicated.101 Thus, while defective consent may be a cause for concern with
respect to contractualizing procedure, it should not be so problematic that it
needs to be banned.102
Finally, contractualized procedure’s effect on public litigation costs poses
another potential problem.103 Unlike in private arbitration, parties do not
internalize certain public costs of the court system when they litigate.104
Because parties do not fully internalize the publicly subsidized costs of

94 Id. (noting that while these arrangements may indeed be efficient, they may have an adverse
reputational effect on the court, and, for that reason, they may be undesirable).
95 See id. at 44–49; Bone, supra note 2, at 1360–68.
96 Bone, supra note 2, at 1363.
97 Id. at 1360.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1362.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See id. at 1368–69.
103 Id. at 1374–75.
104 Id.
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litigation, parties “might use more resources than are intended to be allocated
to the dispute, or use the resources allocated inefficiently.”105
In sum, parties may realize various benefits by contractually modifying the
procedure that governs their litigation.106 While arbitration already allows
parties to tailor their resolution process to their dispute, some parties may
prefer to have their dispute resolved in the public judicial system but pursuant
to their choice of procedures. However, allowing parties the freedom to modify
litigation procedures may be problematic in significant ways,107 perhaps most
importantly because having a set of procedural rules largely legitimizes the
judicial system.108 Nevertheless, a paradigmatic shift relegating the one-sizefits-all set of rules to mere defaults would further the efficiency and freedom of
contract initiatives that the Supreme Court has robustly endorsed in arbitration.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
This section sets the topic of procedural contracts aside to preview the
relevance of recent arbitration jurisprudence to the discussion in Part II. In
doing so, this section illustrates the Supreme Court’s commitment to
expanding freedom of contract in arbitration, setting up an analogy to come in
Part II. This section first discusses the FAA as enacted, and then briefly
catalogs the expansion principles used by the Supreme Court to develop its
modern doctrine.
1. FAA as Enacted
For centuries, courts in the United States and England employed
anti-arbitration measures such as the doctrines of ouster and revocability to
“nullify contracts to arbitrate.”109 The FAA “was enacted in 1925 in response
to widespread judicial hostility to[ward] arbitration,”110 and it did so by placing
arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they]

105 For a discussion on allocation and efficiency concerns associated with contractualized procedure, see
Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 40–42.
106 See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
107 See supra Part I.A.5.
108 See, e.g., Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 42.
109 Horton, supra note 63, at 444–45, 445 n.34.
110 Anjanette H. Raymond, It Is Time the Law Begins to Protect Consumers from Significantly One-Sided
Arbitration Clauses Within Contracts of Adhesion, 91 NEB. L. REV. 666, 668 (2013) (citing Hall St. Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008)).
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belong[].”111 Indeed, “[i]n the most general sense, if a contract dealing with
interstate commerce contains an agreement to arbitrate, the FAA requires that
the arbitration agreement be enforced, unless generally applicable contract
principles render the agreements unenforceable.”112 Thus, the FAA “forbids
courts called upon to enforce agreements to arbitrate from imposing special
burdens on arbitration agreements, but permits courts to hold those agreements
to the same standards that all contracts must meet.”113
2. Expanding the FAA
It was not until several decades after the FAA’s enactment that the
Supreme Court began enthusiastically endorsing arbitration.114 Cases prior to
the 1960s illustrate the Supreme Court’s reluctance in finding disputes arising
under federal statutes—such as the securities laws, the antitrust laws, and the
civil rights laws—arbitrable.115 However, by the 1970s and 1980s, the Court
began robustly enforcing arbitration agreements under the FAA.116 For
example, in the 1980s, the Supreme Court determined that the FAA created
federal substantive law;117 governed in state courts;118 preempted conflicting

111 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984) (noting congressional intent for the FAA to
place “[a]n arbitration agreement . . . upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs” (alteration in
original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924))); see also Horton, supra note 63, at 445 (citing Pub. L.
No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14)).
112 Raymond, supra note 110, at 668 (footnotes omitted). Section 2 of the FAA provides,

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
113 Raymond, supra note 110, at 668. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011) (rejecting the California Discover Bank rule for discriminatorily applying against arbitration
agreements and not contracts generally).
114 See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 2, at 1112–13 (detailing the “[d]emise of the [n]on-[a]rbitrability
[d]octrine” and explaining that “proliferation in the types of arbitrable claims created greater opportunities to
regulate procedure by contract”).
115 Id.; see, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953) (refusing to compel arbitration of a statutory rights claim under the Securities Act).
116 Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 2, at 1113 (noting that in the 1970s and 1980s, “most claims
(including federal statutory ones) became arbitrable”).
117 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). Notwithstanding
the FAA’s creation of federal substantive law, “the Court affirmed the absence of federal question jurisdiction
over cases invoking” the FAA. Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of
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state law;119 and established that arbitrability issues “would be decided as a
matter of federal law in accordance with the federal policy favoring
arbitration.”120 Most significantly, however, in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., the Supreme Court unequivocally
proclaimed, “Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements,”121 assuring lower federal courts that the FAA
demands the advancement of a pro-arbitration policy.
Additionally, until the 1980s, “courts uniformly held that a plaintiff could
not be compelled to arbitrate statutory causes of action.”122 Instead, claims
arising under federal securities, labor, antitrust, patent, pension, and civil rights
laws were only decided in a judicial forum.123 In its seminal 1985 Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. decision, however, the Court
expanded upon its holding in Moses H. Cone,124 holding that, “[b]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum.”125 Today, it is well settled that the Court will permit the
Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (1985). But see Horton, supra note 63, at 445–46 (noting that the
“vast majority of scholars believe” that the FAA was never meant to be a substantive preemptive statute).
118 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
119 In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the Court concluded that the FAA is
based on “the incontestable federal foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over admiralty,’”
388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967), “linking the FAA to Congress’s plenary power to regulate interstate commerce,”
and thereby laying “the doctrinal groundwork for transforming the FAA into preemptive substantive law.”
Ronald G. Aronovsky, The Supreme Court and the Future of Arbitration: Towards a Preemptive Federal
Arbitration Procedural Paradigm?, 42 SW. L. REV. 131, 138 (2012). The Southland Corp. Court recognized
that the Moses H. Cone decision “expressly stated what was implicit in Prima Paint, i. e. [sic], the substantive
law the Act created was applicable in state and federal courts.” Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12 (citing Moses
H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 & n.32); see also Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. Since its decision in Southland
Corp., the Supreme Court has consistently followed this anti-federalist policy, favoring a preemptive FAA.
See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (concluding that the California statute’s requirement for a
judicial forum was in “unmistakable conflict” with the FAA); see also Horton, supra note 63, at 453–54.
120 Hirshman, supra note 117, at 1307.
121 460 U.S. at 24.
122 Horton, supra note 63, at 451.
123 See id. at 451–52 & nn.78–83; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974)
(“Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a
comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII.”).
124 See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25 (“[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .”).
125 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). In a scathing
dissent, Justice Stevens accused the majority of resting “almost exclusively on the federal policy favoring
arbitration of commercial disputes.” Id. at 641 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He asserted that the “federal policy
favoring arbitration” should not “be read to encompass a claim that relies, not on a failure to perform the
contract, but on an independent violation of federal law.” Id. at 645. Additionally, Justice Stevens noted that
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arbitration of statutory rights claims,126 furthering the “principal purpose” of
the FAA, which is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced
according to their terms.”127
Today, federal courts enforce arbitration agreements more zealously than
ever before. By placing an arbitration clause in a standard form contract,128 a
service provider (or employer, or franchisor, etc.) can strip from its customers
(or employees,129 or franchisees,130 etc.): (1) a jury trial;131 (2) the protections
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence;132
(3) a decision based on precedent;133 (4) the ability to aggregate claims of those
similarly situated for a class or collective action;134 (5) their ability (or rational
economic willingness) to seek cost-effective vindication;135 and (6) virtually
any judicial review on the merits.136 However, as Part II will make clear,
“[n]othing in the text of the 1925 Act, nor its legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to authorize
the arbitration of any statutory claims.” Id. at 646. Finally, he emphasized the distinction between arbitrating
contractual claims and statutory claims, since an arbitrator’s “task is to effectuate the intent of the parties
rather than the requirements of enacted legislation.” Id. at 648 (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. 36).
126 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (recognizing that “[i]t is by
now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the
FAA”). However, if “Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue,” then it is improper for a court to compel arbitration. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp., 743 U.S. at 628) (noting that “if such an intention exists, it will be discovered in the text of the [statute],
its legislative history, or an ‘inherent conflict’ between arbitration and the [statute’s] underlying purposes”).
127 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc.
v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312–13 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (compelling arbitration for antitrust
claim because plaintiff “voluntarily entered into a contract containing a bilateral arbitration provision” and
cannot “escape its obligations merely because the claim it wishes to bring might be economically infeasible”).
128 While arbitration agreements in form contracts are presumptively enforceable, strong
counterarguments exist. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 63, at 447–48 (arguing that “even a cursory review of the
FAA’s legislative history reveals that Congress did not want the statute to apply to contracts between parties
with unequal bargaining power”).
129 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109–10 (2001).
130 See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1984).
131 See, e.g., RUTLEDGE, supra note 16, at 170–88, 201 (concluding that “[t]he majority of courts rightly
conclude that general consent to an arbitration clause should be deemed sufficient to waive the jury right”).
132 FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 592.
133 See, e.g., id. at 541.
134 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2010).
135 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (holding a contractual waiver of
class arbitration enforceable under the FAA even when the claimant’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal
statutory claim exceeded his potential recovery).
136 An arbitral award may be vacated only
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were
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despite the judiciary’s commitment to making arbitration customizable, its
justifications for expanding the FAA do not always apply equally to litigation.
II. TEXTUAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT LESS FREEDOM FOR
MODIFYING PROCEDURES IN LITIGATION THAN IN ARBITRATION
The scholarly debate over procedural contracts appears to be in response to
the evolution of arbitration.137 Moreover, several arguments have been made
comparing adjudication via litigation and arbitration.138 One argument is that
“party-made procedures cannot be unfair or inefficient if they are tolerated in
arbitration.”139 Another argument is that “there is little point in disallowing
party rulemaking if the result will be that parties exit adjudication and create
the same procedures in arbitration.”140 Finally, a third argument is that it is a
“good idea to allow parties to design their own procedures in adjudication as a
way to discourage them from escaping adjudication for arbitration.”141
However, because these arguments are flawed,142 an open question remains
among the existing literature.
This Comment seeks to fill the gap in existing scholarship by arguing that
textual and policy-based interpretations of the FAA and the Federal Rules do
not support freeing parties to modify procedure as broadly in litigation as in
arbitration, where the FAA allots parties a tremendous amount of freedom to
modify procedure. Rather, party freedom in contracting for procedure in
litigation should be more constrained than in arbitration.143
This Part argues that procedural rules should be less negotiable in litigation
than in arbitration, but still negotiable to some extent. Parties should have less
freedom to modify procedure in litigation than in arbitration for three reasons.

guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).
137 Hoffman, supra note 2, at 391.
138 Bone, supra note 2, at 1354–55.
139 Id. at 1354; accord Noyes, supra note 2, at 594, 620.
140 Bone, supra note 2, at 1354–55.
141 Id.
142 See id. (explaining why these arguments are weak).
143 See supra notes 128–36 and accompanying text.
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First, the text of the FAA contemplates party choice over a wide array of
terms, whereas the Federal Rules do not. Second, the policies behind having a
one-size-fits-all set of rules for litigation concern more than simply the
immediate disputants to a particular lawsuit. Federal Rule 1 uses the term
“just . . . resolution,” suggesting that parties “own” their dispute to a lesser
degree in litigation than in arbitration. “Just” resolution must account for the
reality that litigation serves both private and public functions. For example,
satisfying parties by allowing them freedom to contract for procedure is not
sufficiently “just” because doing so fails to account for the public functions
litigation serves. Third, because courts cannot constitutionally resolve certain
issues, they have an incentive to maximize procedural freedom in arbitration so
that when an arbitral decision is rendered for such an issue, the court will have
a neutral ground upon which to review the issue’s resolution. This theory
explains why courts might uniquely be willing to broadly enforce certain
procedural terms in arbitration, and not to correspondingly do so in litigation.
Finally, this Part provides support for why parties should be free to modify
litigation procedure to some extent, but not to the same extent as in arbitration.
A. An Attractive, Yet Inappropriate Analogy
Some would argue that because procedural freedom enhances arbitration, it
is desirable in litigation too.144 Indeed, when parties opt for arbitration, they
contract out of the public court system.145 As a result of exiting the public
system, the public rules of procedure no longer apply.146 Had the parties not
entered an arbitration agreement, the Federal Rules would govern in federal
court.147 Despite this distinction, and despite the differences within both
private and public dispute-resolution fora, commentators have analogized
contractually modifying procedure in litigation to customizing private
arbitration.148 However, different federal directives, with different text and
underlying policies, govern the processes differently. The litigation process is
governed by rules promulgated by the judiciary, prescribed in the Federal
Rules.149 Conversely, arbitration is governed by the FAA,150 which provides
144 See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 2, at 594 (arguing and concluding that modified procedures that are
acceptable in arbitration are not repugnant to modified litigation).
145 FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 592.
146 Id.
147 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
148 E.g., Noyes, supra note 2, at 620.
149 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (decreeing that the rules will “govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings”).

KOTLER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

4/18/2016 2:27 PM

CONTRACTUALIZED PROCEDURE

1197

parties with a great deal of flexibility in customizing their own set of rules to
govern their dispute.151
However, unlike the litigation process, arbitration is a creature of contract;
it is entered into—and governed—by contractual agreement.152 Accordingly,
the rules that govern disputants’ arbitration will be stated in a written,
contractual agreement to arbitrate.153 Moreover, unlike the Federal Rules,
which are uniquely designed to “govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts,”154 the FAA is not particularly
designed to govern arbitration procedures. Rather, the FAA is an enforcement
statute.155 It requires that courts enforce arbitration agreements in a broad array
of contracts, to the extent that such agreements do not violate state contract
law.156
Nevertheless, such a distinction between the procedure-governing Federal
Rules and the agreement-enforcing FAA is no more than superficially
important. Because the FAA is an enforcement statute, it can be functionally
similar to the Federal Rules.157 For instance, where parties include procedural
terms in their arbitration agreement, the FAA indiscriminately requires
enforcement.158 In other words, whether an arbitration agreement’s terms are
procedural is immaterial for enforceability purposes. Thus, the FAA can
function as a set of procedural rules by requiring the enforcement of any and
all valid procedural terms set out in the parties’ arbitration agreement.159 For
150

9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
See, e.g., FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 544, 557.
152 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
153 FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 562.
154 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
155 See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (noting that the “preeminent concern
of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that
concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate”).
156 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
157 See id.
158 See id. FAA enforcement is subject to some limitations, though. First, the arbitration provision must be
written and contained in “any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.” Id. Additionally, state contract law limits enforceability. See id. Finally, the FAA does not apply
to “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of worker engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce,” id. § 1, which has been narrowly interpreted. See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105 (2001) (confining the exemption to transportation workers rather than exempting all employment contracts
from the FAA).
159 See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (“Pursuant to Volt, parties have complete freedom to contractually modify the arbitration process by
designing whatever procedures and systems they think will best meet their needs. . . .”); cf. Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (determining that “[j]ust as [private
151
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instance, arbitration agreements in the consumer and employment context will
often incorporate by reference the rules and procedures of for-profit and notfor-profit institutions such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS).160 Undoubtedly,
arbitration agreements containing procedural rules so incorporated are
enforceable to the extent that they are in accordance with the FAA.161 Hence,
even though the FAA does not set out comprehensive procedural guidelines for
arbitration,162 the Act can function as a procedural set of rules by requiring the
enforcement of any procedural terms agreed upon by the parties.
B. An Analysis of Both Texts Supports Less Procedural Modification Freedom
in Litigation than in Arbitration
This section posits that textual interpretations of the FAA and Federal
Rules support less procedural modification freedom in litigation than in
arbitration. The FAA makes it clear that the FAA is a creature of contract,
whereas the Federal Rules do not obviously contemplate the ex ante
commoditization of procedure at all. On one hand, the text of § 2 of the FAA
makes it clear that arbitration is a creature of contract. By referring to “a
written provision” in a “contract,” and by expressly using the term
“agreement,”163 the FAA undoubtedly places parties in the driver’s seat in
tailoring their arbitration. Indeed, under the FAA’s broad protections, parties
have the freedom to customize their arbitration virtually anyway they see fit.164
Among myriad other possibilities, parties can agree to arbitrate individually
parties] may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules
under which that arbitration will be conducted”).
160 FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 566. There are a wide variety of arbitration rules for different trade
groups or practices areas, such as securities disputes, commercial disputes, construction matters, etc. Id.
161 Cf. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (“The preeminent concern of
Congress in passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered . . . .”).
162 If the FAA did, it would seriously hinder the parties’ ability to customize the process by which their
dispute is resolved, which undermines the idea of arbitration altogether.
163 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
164 The FAA is only as broad as courts interpret it to be, and over the last forty years, the trend has been
expansive interpretation. On judicial expansion of the FAA, see David L. Gregory, Michael K. Zitelli &
Christina E. Papadopoulos, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Steelworkers Trilogy: Some Reflections on Judicial
Review of Labor-Arbitration Decisions—Will Gold Turn to Rust?, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 47, 47–48 (2010)
(noting that the Supreme Court’s 1960’s FAA decisions “granted private arbitrators significant power and set
forth principles governing presumptive judicial deference to labor-arbitration decisions”); Hirshman, supra
note 117, at 1305–06 (cataloguing the FAA’s expansion through 1980s Supreme Court decisions); and Thomas
J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of
American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 324–25 (2011) (cataloguing some of the Supreme Court’s
most recent, pro-arbitration decisions).
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and thereby forgo any potential class suit;165 they can agree to arbitrate
statutory claims;166 and they can even agree to delegate arbitrability questions
to the arbitrator herself, rather than let a court decide.167
However, while the Supreme Court and lower federal courts zealously
endeavor to enforce arbitration agreements as written,168 the Court has not yet
adopted wholesale a theory of unlimited party freedom in arbitration.169 The
Court’s treatment of judicial review of arbitral awards illuminates this point.170
The FAA addresses arbitral awards in §§ 9, 10, and 11.171 The pertinent
section, § 10, enumerates four grounds for vacation.172 In 2008, the Supreme
Court settled a circuit split regarding the exclusivity of § 10’s vacation grounds
in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.173
Taking a strictly textual approach, Justice Souter and a majority of five
other Justices issued a pro-arbitration decision that concomitantly limited
parties’ freedom of contract.174 Responding to the petitioner’s argument that
the FAA is “motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce
agreements into which parties ha[ve] entered,”175 the majority acknowledged
that the “FAA lets parties tailor some, even many, features of arbitration by
165

E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (compelling individual
arbitration of a claim arising under the Sherman Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (compelling arbitration of federal antitrust claims). The Court was not always
willing to compel the arbitration of statutory claims. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953)
(denying a motion to compel arbitration for a claim arising under the Securities Act of 1933), overruled by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989).
167 See Rent-A-Center W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 80 (2010) (permitting arbitrators to resolve
challenges to arbitration agreements where parties agree, clearly and unmistakably, to delegate to the arbitrator
the power to do so). In accordance with separability doctrine, a delegation provision gives the arbitrator the
ability to decide not just the validity of the substantive contract, but also the validity of the arbitration
agreement within that contract. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 2, at 1121–22.
168 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
169 Cf. Hall St. Assocs.,v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (limiting parties’ ability to supplement the
FAA’s grounds for vacation).
170 Cf. Paulson, supra note 2, at 493 (noting that “[m]ost cases involving pre-dispute appellate waiver are
in the context of the waiver of appellate review of judgments confirming arbitration awards”).
171 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2012). “Under the terms of § 9, a court ‘must’ confirm an arbitration award
‘unless’ it is vacated, modified, or corrected ‘as prescribed’ in §§ 10 and 11. Section 10 lists grounds for
vacating an award, while § 11 names those for modifying or correcting one.” Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 582.
172 See supra note 136.
173 552 U.S. at 578.
174 Id. at 586 (explaining that “the text compels a reading of the §§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive”).
175 Id. at 585 (alteration in original) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220
(1985)).
166
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contract,” but instead relied on its textual interpretation of the FAA to limit
party autonomy.176 The Court held that the four enumerated grounds were
exclusive—thus denying parties the ability to add supplemental grounds for
judicial review in their arbitration agreement.177 Moreover, applying reasoning
similar to the majority in Hall Street Associates, the Ninth Circuit has also
interpreted the FAA to preclude parties from waiving or eliminating the § 10
vacation grounds with a non-appealability clause.178 Thus, an arbitration
agreement must neither supplement nor eliminate the limited vacation grounds
set out in § 10.
In stark contrast to the FAA—notwithstanding the limitations in § 10—the
Federal Rules are not obviously subject to contractual modification. The
Federal Rules do not ostensibly contemplate the possibility of agreed-upon, ex
ante procedural modifications.179 Instead, the Federal Rules are largely written
in terms of what parties “must” do,180 and specific occasions in which parties
“may” do something.181 However, the fact that the text of the Federal Rules
does not seem to contemplate party modification is inconclusive; courts should
also consider the policies underlying the rules in litigation before comparing
procedural modification in arbitration to litigation.
C. A Policy-Based Approach Also Shows the Analogy Is Inappropriate
This section compares the policies behind the Federal Rules with those
underlying the FAA. Three reasons support the conclusion that parties’
procedural modification freedom in litigation should not be as broad as in
arbitration. First, this section compares the policies behind the FAA and the
176 Id. at 586–87 (explaining its use of the ejusdem generis canon of construction). The Court also
reasoned that the language of § 9 carries “no hint of flexibility.” Id. at 587. Section 9 provides that the court
“must grant” an order confirming an arbitration award “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as
prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.” 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012).
177 Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 583–84. Justice Stevens attacked the majority’s decision for being
incompatible with the FAA’s purpose. Id. at 593–96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (positing that §§ 10 and 11 are
“best understood as a shield meant to protect parties from hostile courts, not a sword with which to cut down”
parties’ agreements).
178 In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig. v. Class Counsel & Party to Arbitration, 737 F.3d
1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
179 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a) (using seemingly inexorable language: “unless [otherwise specified] . . .
the time for serving . . . is as follows”).
180 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b) (“A request for a court order must be made by motion.” (emphasis added));
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1) (“In responding to a pleading a party must” state its defenses and admit or deny
allegations” (emphasis added)).
181 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue . . . on behalf of all members
only if [four requirements are met]” (emphasis added)).
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Federal Rules. It will focus on how the Supreme Court has demonstrated its
commitment to enforcing parties’ arbitration agreements by the agreements’
terms, using class arbitration waiver as an example. In justifying class waiver,
the Court pointed to the “overarching purpose” of the FAA,182 which is to
facilitate “efficient, streamlined proceedings.”183 The purposes of the Federal
Rules are more holistic, however. Thus, promoting efficient resolution by the
terms of private parties’ agreement is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to allow
parties to modify federal procedure by contract—it fails to account for the
litigation’s public identity.
Second, because of the court’s dual identities as a dispute-resolution forum
and as a policymaker,184 litigation must achieve justice beyond the mere
resolution of litigants’ disputes.185 For this reason, this section concludes that
parties “own” their dispute to a lesser extent in litigation than in arbitration,
and thus have less freedom to contractually modify litigation procedure.
Third, because the FAA serves as a neutral enforcement ground for federal
judges to “keep their hands clean” from unconstitutionally resolving certain
types of disputes,186 courts have a unique incentive to maximize procedural
freedom in arbitration.
Finally, this section argues that although parties should have less freedom
to modify procedure in litigation than in arbitration, policies that lead state
legislatures to sanction expedited adjudication initiatives support at least some
degree of party autonomy in contracting for litigation procedure. Nevertheless,
state-sanctioned, expedited adjudication measures are more closely analogous
to one-size-fits-all procedure than party-driven, contractualized procedure.
1. A Policy Comparison Supports Less Procedural Freedom in Litigation
than in Arbitration
The FAA, unlike the Federal Rules, does not expressly announce its
objectives. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has articulated the FAA’s purpose

182

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743 (2011).
Id. at 1749.
184 See Bone, supra note 2, at 1388–90 (noting that viewing courts as performing two separate
functions—resolving disputes and making the law—is “very common,” but arguing that resolving disputes and
making law are better viewed as “two integrated aspects of a single function”).
185 Cf. id. at 1389 (explaining that “courts do not, and are not supposed to, merely resolve disputes”).
186 Cf. Alexander Volokh, The Constitutional Possibilities of Prison Vouchers, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 983, 1016
(2011) (explaining courts’ attempts to resolve disputes under the Establishment Clause).
183
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time and time again: enforcement of private arbitration agreements according
to their terms.187 Additionally, in 2011, the Court explained that the
overarching objective of the FAA is to facilitate “efficient, streamlined
proceedings.”188 The Court’s recent class arbitration decisions are illuminating.
Before holding that an arbitrator may not infer the availability of class
arbitration where the parties’ arbitration clause is silent on that point,189 the
Court assessed the issue on freedom of contract and efficiency grounds.190 The
Court explained that class arbitration “changes the nature of arbitration” from a
simple, bilaterally agreed-upon process to a more formal process that purports
to bind potentially hundreds or thousands of non-consenting parties.191
Furthermore, in Concepcion, the Court concluded that class arbitration is
not aligned with the FAA’s efficiency objective.192 The Court explained,
“[C]lass arbitration requires procedural formality”193 and makes the process
“slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final
judgment.”194
When compared, the three purposes expressed in Rule 1 of the Federal
Rules—just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution195—appear strikingly similar
to the objectives of the FAA—the facilitation of efficient, streamlined
proceedings.196 Indeed, speedy resolution and inexpensive resolution are two
key reasons for parties to choose arbitration over litigation.197 If “speedy” and
“inexpensive” are equated with “efficient,” one can see that the only outlying
purpose of the Federal Rules that is not overtly shared with the FAA is “just”
resolution. Further, unlike the FAA, the Federal Rules show no textual
commitment to contractual freedom.198 The next subsection deals with this
dissimilarity; specifically, it argues that “just” resolution demands that courts
do more than simply enforce parties’ contracts by their terms.

187 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
188 Id. at 1749.
189 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 683–85 (2010).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 685.
192 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
196 See Concepcion, 131. S. Ct. at 1749.
197 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
198 See supra Part II.B.
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2. The Difference in the Nature of the Processes Supports Less Procedural
Modification Freedom in Litigation than in Arbitration
Because both litigation and arbitration aim for speed and cost efficiency,
and because allowing parties freedom to tailor the procedures to their dispute
promotes efficiency, one might argue that litigation ought to follow in
arbitration’s footsteps.199 However, this conclusion cannot be so quickly
drawn; the Federal Rules expressly strive for “just” resolution, whereas the
FAA makes no mention of justice.
This subsection makes two policy-based arguments that suggest why the
parties ought to have less procedural modification freedom in litigation than in
arbitration. First, the court’s dual private and public roles suggest that parties
“own” litigated disputes to a lesser extent than they do arbitrated disputes. The
closer parties come to full ownership of their dispute, the stronger the right to
alter the rules that govern said dispute. Second, the wide latitude for party
freedom under the FAA could be attributable to the fact that arbitrators can
resolve disputes that Article III judges are precluded from resolving. By
allowing parties more freedom to design their arbitration, courts give parties
the tools to effectuate durable arbitral awards. A court may then review the
arbitral award, giving deference to the arbitrator, on neutral contract grounds.
First, the court’s schismatic identities—one public and one private—
suggest that parties “own” litigated disputes to a lesser extent than they do
arbitrated disputes.200 In her 2006 article, Professor Thornburg remarked, “The
implications of [contractualized procedure] are complex, because the public
court system serves both private and public functions.”201 In their private
capacity, she explained, courts react to, and help resolve, private disputes.202 In
their public capacity, courts produce public goods, serve public functions,203
and also serve as important cultural icons.204 Moreover, Thornburg argued that
categorizing procedural components as private, and therefore easy to contract

199 Like this Comment, Professor Bone’s article argues that this conclusion is flawed. See Bone, supra
note 2, at 1354–55.
200 See Noyes, supra note 2, at 620–21 (envisioning litigation’s role as a “dispute resolution process that is
owned by the parties, but subject to Congress’s ultimate power to curb abuses,” but noting some
commentators’ contrary argument that “judicial decisions are ‘owned’ by the public and provide a public
benefit”).
201 Thornburg, supra note 2, at 206.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 207.
204 Id.
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for, or public, and therefore subject to greater scrutiny, is not possible because
most features of civil procedure exist for both reasons.205
Arbitration, on the other hand, serves one true function—private dispute
resolution.206 Because some disputes simply do not threaten or implicate any
public values, arbitration may be a more appropriate resolution forum.207
Parties choose, pay for, and enjoin arbitrators by a set of chosen practices.208
And unlike a judge, an arbitrator is not a public officer.209 Finally, arbitrators
need not concern themselves with following or generating precedent for cases
outside the immediate dispute.210
For the aforementioned reasons, and considering the broad party freedom
the FAA affords parties in arbitration, the idea that parties “own” their dispute
to a greater extent in arbitration than in litigation should be self-evident.211
Arbitration is virtually an entirely private process, whereas litigation might
actually be more public than private.212 It should follow, then, that because
parties “own” their dispute to a greater extent in arbitration than in litigation,
they should not be entitled to the same amount of autonomy over the
procedures that govern their litigation. Thus, for instance, even if a court
enforces a class arbitration waiver under the FAA, the fact that the FAA allows
parties such freedom should not determinatively stand to enforce a contract
purporting to waive class action in litigation.
Second, courts may have an incentive to offer parties broad procedural
freedom in arbitration because arbitral awards are reviewable in court, and thus
serve as neutral grounds for courts to oversee issues that would otherwise be
unconstitutional for them to resolve. Consider, for example, the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, which forbids the U.S. government from
205 Id. at 208 (explaining how pleadings rules, discovery rules, joinder rules, juries, and appeals serve both
public and private functions).
206 Fiss, supra note 7, at 30–31.
207 Id. at 30.
208 Id. at 30–31.
209 Id.
210 FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 541 (explaining that “arbitration awards do not establish precedent in
most circumstances” and that “the absence of published reasoning . . . ensures that awards in one dispute are
not used as precedent in similar situations”).
211 For a discussion about the benefits of a party’s feeling of ownership over his dispute, see Tom R.
Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform,
45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871 (1997).
212 See Fiss, supra note 7, at 30–32. But see Noyes, supra note 2, at 621 (noting that even though “[s]ome
commentators argue that judicial decisions are ‘owned’ by the public,” contractually modified litigation rules
will generate precedents that will provide guidelines for future parties designing their own rules).
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making any law “respecting an establishment of religion.”213 In accordance
with the First Amendment, civil courts are prohibited from deciding matters of
religious law.214
However, a judge may resolve a religious dispute on neutral legal
grounds.215 An arbitral award generates a neutral legal ground for judicial
resolution. Because arbitrators are not considered state actors,216 they may
resolve religious disputes without offending the U.S. Constitution.217 And even
though the FAA does not mention religious arbitration, the FAA provides
neutral grounds for the enforcement of arbitral awards derived therefrom.218
Thus, although a judge may be constitutionally precluded from directly
resolving certain issues, her ability to review an arbitral award enables her to
review the issue on neutral FAA grounds.
From a practical standpoint, the FAA’s broad grant of freedom for tailoring
arbitration terms could be attributable to the fact that arbitrators can resolve
disputes that federal judges are precluded from resolving. By allowing parties
greater freedom in designing the rules of their arbitration, courts give parties
the tools to effectuate satisfactory—and therefore enduring—arbitral awards.
Judges keep their metaphorical “hands” clean by reviewing the arbitral award
on the FAA’s neutral grounds. The need for similarly broad party freedom in
designing dispute-governing procedures does not arise in the case of
procedural contracts because a procedural contract cannot bestow upon an
Article III judge the ability to resolve otherwise constitutionally prohibited
types of disputes.219 In other words, such a contract would not enable a judge
to keep her hands clean because she would still lack a correspondingly neutral
ground upon which to resolve the dispute.

213

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709–10 (1976).
215 Cf. Volokh, supra note 186, at 1020 n.264 (explaining that “[k]osher fraud enforcement schemes are
uncontroversial when they are mere trademark enforcement” (citation omitted)).
216 See, e.g., RUTLEDGE, supra note 16, at 131–44.
217 Cf. Amanda M. Baker, A Higher Authority: Judicial Review of Religious Arbitration, 37 VT. L. REV.
157, 164–66 (2012) (explaining that “courts routinely enforce the decisions of religious tribunals under the
general authority of civil arbitration law”).
218 Id. at 165.
219 See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
214
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3. Recent Expedited Adjudication Initiatives Support Some Degree of
Procedural Optionality in Litigation
Finally, while this Comment has argued that parties should have less
contractual freedom to modify the procedural rules of their dispute in litigation
than in arbitration, it does not suggest that parties should be wholly precluded
from modifying litigation procedure. To the contrary, the existence of
state-sanctioned expedited adjudication rules suggests that society is open to
modified procedure in litigation as a means of achieving efficient dispute
resolution. The New York State Commercial Division’s Rule 9 is the most
recent expedited adjudication initiative and is illustrative.220
Rule 9 allows commercial litigants to contractually opt out of typical,
prolonged, and seemingly incessant litigation procedures without forgoing a
public dispute-resolution forum. In fact, “by matching its primary benefit
(speed and efficiency) while still protecting the parties’ rights in a manner
unique to the judiciary,” the New York Commercial Division’s Rule 9 is
designed to compete with commercial arbitration and manifests the state’s
recognition of the necessity of avoiding the perpetuation of years-long
litigation.221 Rule 9(b) explains that all pre-trial proceedings shall be ready
within nine months.222 To achieve such a goal, Rule 9(c) sets out alternative
and expeditious procedural rules that govern any ensuing litigation between
signatories.223 By subscribing to Rule 9’s expedited adjudication procedures,
parties “irrevocably” waive “any objections based on lack of personal
jurisdiction or . . . forum non conveniens”; the right to a jury trial; “the right to
recover punitive or exemplary damages”; and “the right to any interlocutory
appeal.”224 Parties also “irrevocably” waive “the right to discovery,” unless
they either agree otherwise or conduct very limited discovery prescribed by the
statute.225

220

See N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.70(g) (2015) (Accelerated Adjudication Actions).
See David Ball & Daniel Meyers, Expedited Procedures in New York Courts Guarantee Trial in Just
Nine Months, JD SUPRA: BUS. ADVISOR (June 20, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/expeditedprocedures-in-new-york-courts-48104/.
222 See N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.70(g).
223 See id.
224 See id.
225 See id.
221
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Interestingly, Rule 9 does not govern unless the disputing parties
contractually consent to the Rule’s application.226 Essentially, Rule 9 enables
parties to enter into a procedural contract that generates an alternative set of
rules pre-approved by the New York state legislature. While New York’s
expedited adjudication initiative demonstrates the state’s commitment to
providing an option for efficient, tailored litigation, Rule 9 provides only
limited freedom in the sense that parties can choose to substitute one statesanctioned set of procedural rules for another.
By comparing a Rule 9 agreement with an arbitration agreement under the
FAA, this Comment’s core argument is brought to life. Along the freedom of
contract spectrum, where arbitration is toward the full-freedom end and
non-negotiable rules are on the other end, Rule 9 illustrates that parties can
contractually modify procedures in litigation, but only to an extent sanctioned
by the legislature, and not to the same extent as in an arbitration agreement that
is controlled by the parties.
In sum, this Part has argued that parties ought to have less procedural
modification freedom in litigation than in arbitration. Both the text of—and
policies underlying—the FAA and the Federal Rules support this conclusion.
However, this is not to say that parties should have no procedural modification
freedom at all; on the contrary, state-expedited adjudication initiatives such as
the New York Commercial Division’s newly enacted Rule 9 demonstrate
society’s approval of some degree of procedural optionality in litigation.
III. A PROCEDURAL FREEDOM CONUNDRUM: THE AMOUNT OF PROCEDURAL
MODIFICATION FREEDOM MATTERS
Based on both textual and policy reasons, this Comment has argued that
parties should have less freedom in modifying procedure in litigation than they

226 Eric Fishman, Andrew C. Smith & Shriram Harid, Client Alert: New York Creates Rocket-Docket for
Commercial Disputes—But Accelerated Adjudication Comes With Trade-Offs, PILLSBURY (June 2, 2014),
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/AlertJune2014LitigationNYCreatesRocketDocketforCom
mercialDisputes.pdf. The model language for such a contractual provision states as follows:

Subject to the requirements for a case to be heard in the Commercial Division, the parties agree
to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commercial Division, New York State Supreme
Court, and to the application of the Court’s accelerated procedures, in connection with any
dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this agreement, or the breach,
termination, enforcement or validity thereof.
Id. (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.70(g)).
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do in arbitration. Building on this argument, this Part unfolds in two sections.
First, it asserts the general implications of a broad procedural-freedom regime,
a no-freedom regime, and a mixed-freedom regime.227 Second, it applies the
textual and policy-based reasoning in Part II to procedural terms which are
already common in arbitration, and which may correspondingly begin arising
in contracts that modify litigation.
A. Implications Based on the Amount of Procedural Freedom Courts Permit
As procedural contracts become more common, the judiciary will be tasked
with adopting a broad procedural-modification-freedom regime, a no-freedom
regime, or a mixed-freedom regime. Each regime will have significant
implications on notions of “just” resolution. This section examines the
implications that follow the adaptation of each of these regimes.
First, if the judiciary broadly enforces parties’ procedural modifications—
akin to arbitration—litigation will appear to serve more of a private
dispute-resolution function than a public function. Because litigants would
have more flexibility in tailoring their dispute-resolution process, they would
likely modify procedures in ways that are cost and time efficient for them.228
Moreover, this efficiency could benefit the public by lessening the burden on
the judicial system and preserving judicial resources unnecessarily spent under
a one-size-fits-all regime.229 The implication under this broad-freedom regime,
therefore, would be that the judiciary’s grant of freedom hews closely to “just”
resolution.230
However, enhancing parties’ freedom to contractually modify procedure
comes with costs and negative externalities to the public. For instance, judicial
integrity and legitimacy concerns such as those raised in Part I are most
troublesome under a broad-freedom regime. Specifically, one example is the
potential for distorted precedent: besides simply distinguishing cases based on

227 As evidenced by forum-selection clauses, jury-trial waivers, arbitration clauses, and expedited
adjudication mini-codes of procedure, a mixed-freedom regime seems most likely.
228 See, e.g., Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 41–42 (explaining that “[t]he efficiency of
contractualized procedures depends on whether the total expected litigation costs, public and private, justify
the efficiency gains in performance incentives”).
229 Noyes, supra note 2, at 632.
230 This Part’s reference to “just” resolution refers to the explicit purpose statement in Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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their facts, in a broad-freedom regime, cases may become distinguishable
based on the specific procedures followed.231
Indeed, the judiciary could adopt a strictly textual view of the Federal
Rules. Under this view, it would not be far-fetched for the judiciary to simply
strike down procedural contracts where there is a Federal Rule on point. The
implication of a virtually non-negotiable set of rules is that party freedom and
private dispute resolution do not equate closely to “just” resolution. Instead,
“just” resolution would appear to depend more closely on the public functions
of the court, such as crafting durable precedents.
However, a strict no-modification regime seems unlikely, especially in
light of the Supreme Court’s recent developments. For example, in Carnival
Cruise Lines, the Court made it clear that forum-selection clauses are
presumptively enforceable.232 Moreover, the New York State Commercial
Division’s Rule 9 is an example of a legislature’s prerogative in tailoring
litigation for efficiency purposes.233 By providing an alternative,
efficiency-driven set of procedural rules for commercial disputants, Rule 9
may make litigation more desirable to parties who would otherwise exit the
public system for arbitration.
Finally, another—and more realistic—possibility is a mixed-freedom
regime, where the judiciary would allow the modification of some, but not all,
procedural terms, and to differing extents based on the term.234 Professor
Bone’s argument is enlightening on this point. He argues that judges employ a
distinctive form of reasoning in litigation.235 At litigation’s core, he asserts, is a
“commitment to reasoning from general principle and doing so in a way that
engages the facts of particular cases.”236 Thus, he argues, parties should be able
to contractually modify procedure ex ante, but only to the extent that their

231

See, e.g., Bone, supra note 2, at 1377–78.
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–96 (1991) (noting the “‘heavy burden of
proof’ required to set aside the [forum-selection] clause,” thus creating a presumption in favor of enforcing
forum-selection clauses (citation omitted) (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17
(1972))).
233 See N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.70(g) (2015).
234 See Bone, supra note 2, at 1385–94.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 1388.
232
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modifications do not undermine the capacity of judges or juries to engage in
what he calls “principled reasoning.”237
However, as Bone recognizes, ascertaining which procedural alterations
unduly interfere with principled reasoning is by no means a simple task.238
Furthermore, his argument leaves open the question of how courts should treat
terms that are common to arbitration but not in litigation. The next section will
discuss this point in more detail.
B. Applying Textual and Policy-Based Reasoning to Procedural Terms
Common to Arbitration Agreements
Terms that are common to arbitration but not so common in litigation, such
as class and appeals waivers, do not readily appear to interfere with the
principled reasoning at the core of litigation.239 In determining the extent to
which parties should be able to modify these procedural terms in litigation,
courts should look to the text of the federal directive on point as well as the
policies underlying those directives.
1. Terms Modifying Class Action
It is not difficult to imagine that many commercial entities and employers
that already utilize class arbitration waivers might prefer litigation to
arbitration if they were equally able to insulate themselves from potential class
actions.240 Indeed, textually, Rule 23 does not bestow any substantive right
upon individuals to aggregate a class;241 rather, it sets out the procedures that
govern potential class actions.242 While the text does not provide much

237 Id. But cf. Noyes, supra note 2, at 626–29 (positing that truth-seeking is not the primary purpose of the
Federal Rules and that “society is content if courts get it right somewhat more often than not” (quoting
Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705, 741 (2004))).
238 Bone, supra note 2, at 1391–94 (applying legal theorist Lon Fuller’s views on adjudication to draw
normative distinctions between modifying rules that “alter pleading standards,” for example, and those that
might “instruct the judge to decide the case solely on the basis of written submissions without any oral
argument”); accord Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364, 366
(1978).
239 See Bone, supra note 2, at 1385–94.
240 Cf., e.g., Jean Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice,
90 OR. L. REV. 703, 724–25 (2012) (positing that Concepcion will lead to a significant decrease in class
actions filed in state and federal court due to the availability of arbitral class action waivers).
241 Of course, a Federal Rule is not supposed to bestow substantive rights on parties. See Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
242 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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guidance on whether waiver should be acceptable in litigation,243 the text
clearly does not support, for example, modification of the prerequisites to
aggregate a class.244 Thus, although the procedures that govern putative or
pending class actions appear non-negotiable, the text is wholly inconclusive
regarding whether parties should be able to waive class actions in litigation in
an ex ante procedural contract.
On the other hand, from a policy standpoint, class actions pose numerous
controversial “access to justice” and fundamental fairness questions that are
well beyond the scope of this Comment.245 However, for the purposes of this
Comment, recall that the Supreme Court relied heavily on the FAA’s primary
objectives of freedom of contract and efficiency in holding arbitral class
waivers enforceable.246
Class action waivers should not be as freely negotiable in litigation as in
arbitration because the goals of the Federal Rules are best achieved by
protecting class actions from unlimited, pre-dispute waiver in private
procedural contracts. While one could argue that broad party freedom to waive
class action in litigation would be more efficient,247 Rule 1’s demand for “just”
resolution should outweigh such an argument.248 Class actions produce public
goods in the sense that they are forceful enough to cause societal change in
ways that individual litigation cannot.249 And, considering that in many
instances parties that would be interested in insulating themselves from class
liability have the ability to arbitrate their disputes, allowing these parties to do
so in litigation could essentially eradicate this valuable public, justice-seeking
device.
2. Terms Modifying Appeals
On the other hand, parties should have broad freedom to enter into
pre-dispute contracts that waive appeal in litigation, even though they do not

243 Both Rule 23(a)’s “may sue or be sued” language and 23(b)’s passive “may be maintained if” language
are ambiguous in this respect. See id.
244 See id. (using “only if” language to make four explicit prerequisites necessary).
245 On the “romantic class action narrative,” see Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know
Them: Rethinking The American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399 (2014).
246 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748–49 (2011).
247 See FREER, supra note 55, at 771.
248 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
249 See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Enforcing the Social Compact Through Representative Litigation, 33 CONN.
L. REV. 1239 (2001) (arguing class suits bring social change).
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have such broad freedom in arbitration. Scholars largely agree that parties
should be able to waive appeals in a pre-dispute procedural contract,250 and the
textual and policy-based reasoning in Part II further supports this conclusion.
First, a textual analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure supports broad party freedom in waiving signatories’ ability to
appeal251—unlike the text of the FAA.252 Second, because parties already can
and do waive their ability to appeal, allowing parties to do so in an ex ante
procedural contract would not raise significant policy concerns.
The texts governing civil litigants’ ability to appeal support broad party
freedom in agreeing to waive appeals in an ex ante procedural contract. Indeed,
civil litigants in federal court have a statutory right, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, to
appeal a federal district court’s final judgment.253 While this statute provides
that “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States,”254 the text of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure makes indisputably clear that parties need not
appeal, and in fact, forgo appeal without affirmatively and timely filing for an
appeal.255 Because the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure contemplate that
parties may choose not to appeal, the text, by implication, suggests that parties
could agree in advance not to appeal.256
Furthermore, policy supports broad party freedom in waiving the ability to
appeal in an ex ante procedural contract. Although the case law regarding
appeals waivers is “quite thin,” parties already ubiquitously forgo appeal in
settlement agreements,257 and virtually waive any merit-based appeal the
instant they sign an arbitration agreement.258 Eliminating appeals is efficient
for at least two reasons. First, federal courts of appeals dockets are heavily
250 See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 2, at 612–13; Thornburg, supra note 2, at 201–02 (positing that parties
should be able to eliminate prospective appeal in a pre-dispute contract).
251 See infra notes 254–55.
252 See supra Part II.B. Comparing waiver of judicial review in litigation to arbitration is inappropriate
because although the FAA contains textual evidence that arbitration is meant to be a creature of contract, it
nevertheless provides exclusive grounds for judicial review. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). The Federal Rules do
not.
253 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
254 Id. (emphasis added).
255 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1) (“An appeal permitted by law as of right from a district court to a
court of appeals may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within the time allowed
by Rule 4.” (emphasis added)).
256 See supra note 255.
257 Bone, supra note 2, at 1351.
258 Thornburg, supra note 2, at 201–02.
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burdened.259 Second, waiving appeal also eliminates the possibility of
remand.260 Furthermore, eliminating appeals would naturally make litigation
less expensive because parties would spend less time litigating. While one
counterargument to this is that parties may spend more money making sure
that courts with original jurisdiction get it right the first time, this is highly
conjectural and hard to determine.
Finally, justice concerns, while split, can be viewed to support broad party
freedom in waiving appeals. Viewing Rule 1’s demand for “just” resolution as
more concerned with public justice than private contractual fulfillment, one
may argue that appeals serve the public by creating better, more authoritative
precedent and by providing a systematic safeguard to fix potentially “absurd”
district court decisions.261 However, even this public justice argument can be
discounted; as a matter of public policy, one could argue that appellate waivers
“encourag[e] litigants to accept as final decisions of courts of original
jurisdiction.”262
Thus, courts will ultimately decide how much procedural modification
freedom parties should have when they either enforce or reject contracts with
procedural terms. A broad-freedom regime would imply that “just” resolution
can be fulfilled by enforcing parties’ agreements by their terms—albeit
procedural terms—in litigation. A no-freedom regime would do the opposite,
and emphasize that “just” resolution is fulfilled on a more public level. Finally,
even with a mixed-freedom approach, courts may deal with class or appeal
waivers that do not interfere with a judge’s ability to apply principled
reasoning. These terms should be assessed by the federal directive’s text and
underlying policies before the judiciary uncritically follows arbitration’s
guidance in litigation.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, parties should have less freedom in modifying procedure in
litigation than they do in arbitration. In coming to this conclusion, this
Comment journeyed through background information regarding procedural
contracts and the similarly principled arbitration alternative. Having focused
259

Id.
Id.
261 See Paulson, supra note 2, at 496–98; see also Rodriguez v. Villarreal, 314 S.W.3d 636, 645–46 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2010); C.G. Horman Co. v. Lloyd, 499 P.2d 124, 127 (Utah 1972) (Crockett, J., dissenting).
262 Paulson, supra note 2, at 498 (quoting Harmina v. Shay, 101 N.J. Eq. 273, 274 (1927)).
260
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exclusively on pre-dispute agreements, this Comment proceeded to list the
advantages of procedural contracts and offered a brief explanation as to why
parties might prefer contractually modified litigation to arbitration.
By entering a bargained-for, legally valid, pre-dispute procedural contract,
signatories can reduce litigation costs,263 prevent opportunistic behavior,264
shape their pre-dispute behavior,265 and acquire an information signaling and
sorting mechanism at the time of contracting.266 These advantages are unique
to pre-dispute procedural contracts, for parties’ incentives may significantly
realign after a dispute arises.267 Moreover, although parties might choose
arbitration for various reasons,268 arbitration could be prohibitively expensive,
difficult to negotiate, and may subject parties to a final ruling by an arbitrator,
whose incentives may be tainted by extraneous market pressures.
However, unencumbered procedural-modification freedom may pose
significant problems in litigation. Customized litigation procedure might
confuse, overwhelm, or unduly burden the court;269 impede information
exchanges;270 undermine judicial integrity;271 create problems associated with
defective consent in non-freely-bargained-for contracts;272 and allow parties to
inefficiently allocate and use public judicial resources.273
Nevertheless, while case law involving procedural contracts in litigation is
largely lacking, the Supreme Court’s doctrinal endorsement of arbitration has
created a tempting comparison between arbitration and modifiable litigation.
The Court’s consistent reliance on freedom of contract and efficiency
principles in arbitration274 may be analogously impactful in the face of
procedural contracts in litigation. However, for textual and policy-based
reasons, making this comparison uncritically is inappropriate.275

263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275

See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 2, at 16–19.
Id.
Id. at 19–23.
See id. at 23–25.
Supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
Supra note 78.
Supra note 79 and accompanying text.
Supra note 80 and accompanying text..
Supra note 81 and accompanying text.
Supra note 82.
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748–49 (2011).
See supra Part II.
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Instead, parties should have less freedom to modify procedure in litigation
than in arbitration for three reasons. First, the text of the Federal Rules does
not contemplate parties’ contractual modification, whereas the FAA is clearly
consent-driven, even where procedural terms are at issue.276 Second, the
court’s dual private and public roles suggest that parties “own” litigated
disputes to a lesser extent than they do arbitrated disputes. The closer parties
come to full ownership of their dispute, the stronger the right to alter the rules
that govern said dispute. Third, the wide latitude for party freedom under the
FAA could be attributable to the fact that arbitrators can resolve disputes that
Article III judges are precluded from resolving. Essentially, by providing
parties with great latitude to tailor their arbitration, courts give parties the tools
to effectuate durable arbitral awards. Finally, it is worth reiteration that this
Comment does not mean to imply that parties should not have any procedural
modification freedom in litigation. To the contrary, state-expedited
adjudication initiatives illustrate both judicial pushback against arbitration and
implicit endorsement of party-driven procedural optionality.277
Realistically, by either enforcing or rejecting procedural contracts as they
arrive on the scene, courts will determine how much freedom parties have in
modifying procedure in litigation. Allowing parties broad freedom will have
profound implications on notions of “just” resolution by highlighting the
judiciary’s private identity; offering very little freedom, on the other hand,
would embolden its public identity. Ultimately, courts should look at the text
and policies behind rules that parties seek to contractually modify in
litigation—uncritically accepting arbitration as perfectly analogous is simply
inapposite.
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